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Islamophobic  sentiments  in the  Western  world  have  gained  scientiﬁc  attention,  particularly
after the  terrorist  attacks  of  September  11,  2001.  However,  the  effects  of  religious  stigma  on
Muslim minorities’  identity  formation  have  rarely  been  studied.  Using  structural  equation
modeling,  this  cross-sectional  study  examined  direct  and  indirect  effects  of  different  forms
of  religious  stigma  on  the  national  afﬁliation  of  210 Norwegian-Pakistani  and  216  German-
Turkish Muslims.  Furthermore,  the  study  examined  the  mediator  role  of  religious  identity.
Our results  suggest  that being  a Muslim  in  Norway  is  more  reconcilable  with afﬁliating
with  the  nation  than  being  a Muslim  in Germany.  However,  across  the  samples,  the  results
indicated  that  various  forms  of  religious  stigma  affected  Muslims’  national  identity  and
engagement  in the  public  and  private  sphere  in distinct  ways.  These  effects  were  both
positive  and  negative,  differed  between  the  two  samples,  and  in Germany,  were  mediated  by
the  participants’  religious  identity.  The  ﬁndings  indicated  that  the  ways  in  which  religious
stigma  inﬂuences  Muslims’  national  afﬁliation  is context  and  culture  bound.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
. Introduction
Anti-Muslim and islamophobic sentiments in the Western world have gained increased scientiﬁc attention following the
eptember 11, 2001 terror attacks (Sirin & Balsano, 2007). Although the identity formation of ethnic minorities in general has
een a frequent topic of research, the effects of religious stigma on the identity formation of Muslims living in societies that
re suspicious of Islamic beliefs have been a neglected topic. Accordingly, this study set out to explore the extent to which
erceptions of an islamophobic society, experiences of religious discrimination and negative representations of Muslims in
he media inﬂuence Muslims’ religious identity, national identity and national engagement in a group of Norwegian-Pakistani
nd German-Turkish1 Muslims.
.1. Rise of Islamophobia in the western world
While the religious composition of many Western European countries have remained stable over long periods of time,
ncreasing south-north migration in recent years is contributing to the development of multireligious societies (Simon,
004). Many of the immigrants come from countries where Islam is the majority religion, and currently, between 13 and 14
illion people living in Western Europe have Muslim backgrounds (Maréchal, 2002). The changing intranational religious
∗ Corresponding author at: Postboks 1094 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway. Tel.: +47 22845069.
E-mail address: j.r.kunst@psykologi.uio.no (J.R. Kunst).
1 In order to reﬂect their hyphenated cultural backgrounds, the participants in the present study are referred to as Norwegian-Pakistanis and German-
urks.
147-1767/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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composition of many European countries, however, is not embraced by everyone. As Poynting and Mason (2007) point out,
there has been a shift “from anti-Asian and anti-Arab racism to anti-Muslim racism” (p. 61) and this has been heightened
following the terror attacks of 9/11. Likewise, political debates have increasingly focused on questions regarding Muslim
immigrants, who are often seen as difﬁcult to integrate (Field, 2007), whereas right-wing political parties and individuals in
many countries have promoted the idea of insurmountable cultural differences, creating an atmosphere of hostility (Betz &
Meret, 2009).
The term ‘Islamophobia’, which was reportedly introduced at the end of the 1980s (Runnymede Trust Commission, 1997),
has increasingly been used to describe this fear of Islam and of Muslims as a social group. Furthermore, various studies and
reports have reported a rise of Islamophobia in many Western majority populations and in Western media (e.g., EUMC,
2006; Poynting & Mason, 2006; Saeed, 2007).
1.2. From anti-immigrant to anti-Muslim: the emergence of Islamophobia in Germany and Norway
In Germany, immigration has been the subject of highly charged and partly inﬂammatory political discourse over the
last four decades (Thränhardt, 1995). Since the beginning of the 21st century, public discourse on immigration has increas-
ingly focused on Muslims and Islam as a major challenge to “liberal democracy and Germany’s political order” (Bauder &
Semmelroggen, 2009, p. 20). A 2004 opinion poll in Germany indicated that a vast majority of the participants associated
Islam with terror and with the oppression of women. Moreover, more than half of the respondents did not believe in the
peaceful coexistence of Christianity and Islam (Noelle, 2004; PEW Research Center, 2006).
This development ultimately peaked in August 2010, when ThiloSarrazin, a representative of the German Social Demo-
cratic Party, in a bestselling book stated that migration from Islamic countries constitutes a major threat to the European
cultural model and that Muslim migrants generally are uninterested in education, unwilling to integrate and a threat to the
nation.
Although Sarrazin’s views were spurned and criticized by some, they seemed to reﬂect the Zeitgeist. In recent represen-
tative opinion polls, about half of the German participants agreed with Sarrazin’s statements, and nearly 20% indicated that
they would vote for a political party with Sarrazin as a leader (Consumer ﬁeld work, 2010; Silalahi, 2010). Moreover, an
opinion poll published in 2010 showed that most participants agreed with the statement that “Muslims’ religious practice
in Germany should be substantially restricted” (Decker, Weißmann, Kiess, & Brähler, 2010). Finally, the recently appointed
interior minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, publicly asserted that “Islam does not belong to Germany” (Vitzthum, 2011).
In Norway, since the 1980s, negative attitudes against immigration have received increased public attention and support
from the majority population (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1999; Blom, 2009). As in other Western countries, Muslims in Norway
have received a lot of attention in the media following 9/11, reaching its climax in 2006, when the Norwegian magazine
“Magazinet” reprinted the Danish caricatures of the prophet Mohammed, which caused Muslims all over the world to
protest (Steien, 2008). As a result, questions related to the compatibility of Islam with basic Norwegian societal values
have repeatedly been raised, speciﬁcally dealing with Muslim women’s veiling practices, oppression of women, freedom of
speech and democracy in general (ECRI, 2009). Not surprisingly, increasing numbers of Norwegians are skeptical to Muslim
immigrants and immigration (IMDi, 2007). On the 22nd of July 2011, the terror attacks by Anders Behring Breivik, a self-
declared Islam-hater and enemy of multiculturalism, tragically indicate that these sentiments also have become part of the
Norwegian society in a radicalized form.
Norwegian-Pakistanis and German-Turks constitute the largest Muslim minority groups and the largest non-Western
groups of labor immigrants in their respective countries. However, whereas nearly 55% of the Norwegian-Pakistanis possess a
Norwegian passport (Statistics Norway, 2010), only about one fourth of the German-Turks have a German passport (German
Federal Foreign Ofﬁce, 2010), suggesting that the naturalization process of labor migrants to Europe has come a longer way
in Norway.
Lastly, German-Turks and Norwegian-Pakistanis are often seen as unsuccessful minority groups compared to other ethnic
minorities. Several reports have described both groups as poorly integrated in light of their high unemployment rates, low
academic achievements and relatively poor proﬁciency in the national language (see, e.g., Daugstad, 2008; German Federal
Statistical Ofﬁce, 2007; also see Table 9 of Statistics Norway, 2009).
1.3. Identity formation of stigmatized minority groups with a migrational background
For immigrants in plural societies, the task of reconciling their cultural and ethnic heritage with a new national identity
constitutes a central issue (Sam & Berry, 2010). The process of acquiring a national identity does not imply that immigrants
abandon their cultural roots. Rather, according to Stepick and Stepick (2002),  given that the new country encourages cultural
variation, immigrants become part of the multicultural composition within the nation’s territory. Thus, immigrants can
maintain their cultural identity while adopting a new national identity.
In a settlement society where cultural diversity is not celebrated, immigrants may  perceive their cultural identity as being
derided and may  experience discrimination, negative stereotypes and prejudice based on their group membership. In this
regards, because individuals’ self-concepts are based to a large extent on their social identities derived from various group
memberships (see, e.g., Brown, 2000), individuals who  perceive that they lack the resources to deal with being a target of
stigma may  experience threats to their selves (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). When individuals face identity threats, they
5e
v
m
r
b
&
o
f
i
&
A
s
1
w
J
f
m
J
s
i
y
f
e
b
C
r
1
r
g
I
p
n
a
m
s
m
m
M
f
c
1
2
320 J.R. Kunst et al. / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 36 (2012) 518– 532
mploy diverse coping strategies. One strategy is to trivialize stigma-related events by simply diminishing the discriminatory
alue of a potential stressor (Major et al., 2002). Nevertheless, members of groups that are chronic targets of discrimination
ay  be highly vigilant to stigma (Major et al., 2002) and may  not be able to simply minimize the discriminatory value of an
espective event. Conversely, they are likely to choose an “intropunitive or extropunative focus” (Major et al., 2002, p. 257)
y either attributing negative treatment to themselves or to external factors.
Another strategy to cope with identity threats may  be to disengage from, and avoid identity-threatening domains (Major
 O’Brien, 2005; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). However, research has also shown that individuals may  choose the
pposite approach. On the one hand, they may  engage in counter-stereotypic behavior in an effort to appear as different
rom their stigmatized group (Steele et al., 2002). On the other hand, they may  choose to further increase their engagement
n threatening domains, developing innovative strategies to circumvent obstacles and to achieve positive outcomes (Miller
 Major, 2003).
Yet another possible way of coping with identity threats is to alter one’s identiﬁcation with the stigmatized group.
lthough there is no consensus about the causal relation between individuals’ group identiﬁcation and the experience of
tigma, altered group identiﬁcation may  result from, rather than predict identity threats (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey,
999). In this situation, individuals with a low group identity may  further reduce their in-group identiﬁcation when faced
ith stigma, whereas persons with a high group identity may  increase their identiﬁcation (Major & O’Brien, 2005).
In multicultural societies, the experience of stigma may  crucially affect the formation of minorities’ identities (Mähönen,
asinskaja-Lahti, & Liebkind, 2011). Two models have attempted to explain the consequences of stigma for minorities’ identity
ormation. According to the rejection-identiﬁcation model (RIM) developed by Branscombe et al. (1999),  minority group
embers increase their group identity as a response to stigma. In contrast, in their rejection-disidentiﬁcation model (RDIM),
asinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, and Solheim (2009) suggest that individuals decrease their national identiﬁcation as a coping
trategy. However, while the RIM model does not include multiple in-group identities and has only gained partial support
n replication studies (see, e.g., Leach, Mosquera, Vliek, & Hirt, 2010), the RDIM was  developed only recently and has not
et been tested in other studies to the best of our knowledge. Thus, the distinct effects of stigma on minorities’ identity
ormation remain an area for future research.
Considering that many ethnic minorities are also members of religious minority groups, it is striking how little this
merging ﬁeld has paid attention to religious identity. According to Foner and Alba (2008),  religion can act as a mediator
y helping minorities to cope with acculturative stress and social isolation, thereby easing their adaption to the society.
onsequently, members of religious minority groups may  strengthen their religious identity in order to cope with stigma-
elated experiences (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007; Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010).
.4. Aim of the study and hypotheses
Given the societal climate and the aforementioned theoretical framework, Muslims may  experience stigma based on their
eligious group membership, which, in turn, may  affect their afﬁliation with the dominant society and with their religious
roup. To our knowledge, only Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) and Sirin et al. (2008) have estimated these relations to date.
n the Verkuyten and Yildiz study, religious identity negatively impacted the national identiﬁcation of the Dutch-Turkish
articipants. Furthermore, perceived group rejection was found to be a positive predictor of religious identity, whereas it
egatively predicted national identity. However, Sirin et al.’s study focused on U.S. Muslims from various ethnic backgrounds
nd their results indicated that the participants’ religious identity was positively correlated with their national identity.
In short, the studies conducted so far do not provide an unambiguous ﬁnding of the inﬂuence of stigma on Muslim
inorities’ identity formation. Moreover, the studies have not explicitly distinguished between different mechanisms of
tigma, which may  vary in their strength of impact on different constructs measuring Muslims’ national afﬁliation.
Against this background, the present study seeks a better understanding of how religious identity and religious stigma
ight inﬂuence Muslims’ national identiﬁcation and engagement. For religious stigma, we  distinguished between religious
eta-stereotypes, speciﬁcally perceived Islamophobia, religious discrimination and negative collective representations of
uslims in media. To investigate the degree to which these relations are universal or dependent on cultural and contextual
actors, the study explicitly compared the experiences of the two largest Muslim minorities in two Western European
ountries, namely German-Turks and Norwegian-Pakistanis.
Speciﬁcally, we examine the following hypotheses:
. Religious identity will be inversely related to national identiﬁcation and engagement. Given the opinion climate in
Norway and Germany, where being a Muslim is frequently presented as irreconcilable with being a member of the
nation, we expected that participants would cope with a religious identity threat by decreasing their involvement in, and
identiﬁcation with their nation of residence.
. The three stigma constructs (i.e., perceived Islamophobia, negative representations in media and religious discrimination)
were expected to have direct negative effects on the participants’ national identity and engagement. In other words, the
various forms of religious stigma were expected to induce a religious identity threat, to which the participants would
respond with national disengagement and disidentiﬁcation.
. All stigma constructs were expected to also have indirect negative effects on the outcome variables that are mediated
by religious identity. When coping with a religious identity threat resulting from religious stigma, the respondents were
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Table  1
General characteristics of the population.
Characteristic Norway (n = 210) Germany (n = 216)
Age, M (SD)a 25.1 (7.4) 23.7 (4.3)
Gender in female % 66.5 56.9
Civil  status as single % 56.1 64.8
Socioeconomy, M (SD)b 4.5 (1.4) 4.2 (1.1)
Religious group
Sunni 92.0 86.1
Others 8.0 13.9
Religiously visiblec in %
Female 41.7 24.4
Male  31.0 14.0
Host  nationality in %d 92.9 44.4
2nd  Generation immigrants 71.9 88.4
Reason for migration in %
Work 71.9 76.4
Family reunion 19.5 10.2
Studies 1.0 5.6
Politics 1.0 1.4
Occupation in %
Student 48.6 57.4
Employed 39.1 29.2
Apprentice 1.0 10.2
Unemployed/retired 8.6 1.9
Note. Missing percentage corresponds to “other”.
a t(333.29) = 2.49, p < .01, M  = 1.46, 95% CI [.31, 2.62], est 2 = .01.
b t(395.99) = 2.16, p < .05, M  = 0.27, 95% CI [.02, .51], est 2 = .01.
c Female: Hijab, Niqa¯b, Burka, Chaddor or other. Male: Beard, Turban, Hat or other.
d The samples differed signiﬁcantly in regard of the percentage of participants holding the host nation’s nationality 2 (1, N = 426) = 88.45, p < .001, ϕ = .46.
expected to strengthen their religious identity. In line with the ﬁrst hypothesis, this was expected to impinge negatively
on their national identity and engagement.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 426 respondents completed the survey, of whom 210 were Norwegian-Pakistanis and 216 German-Turks. The
majority of participants in both samples were young adults, most of whom were female, Sunni Muslims and belonged to the
second-generation of immigrants (see Table 1). Most of the Norwegian-Pakistani participants had naturalized as Norwegian
nationals, whereas only about half of the German-Turkish participants were naturalized German nationals.
2.2. Procedure
The data were obtained through online surveys conducted in 2010 in Norway and Germany from the end of August until
the end of September. Bilingual teams translated the survey into the countries’ ofﬁcial languages, as well as the widely
spoken minority languages.
The 426 participants who completed the surveys were mainly recruited through religious or cultural organizations,
personal contacts and online social networks. As an incentive to ﬁll out the survey, each participant had the possibility to
win a voucher of 500 Norwegian Kroner or 50 Euro.
All respondents were informed about the purpose of the study in advance and received information regarding its conﬁ-
dentiality. Moreover, the participants were reminded about their right to withdraw from participation at any time.
2.3. Measurement
Unless stated, the scales had 6-point Likert-type response categories: endpoints “totally disagree” and “totally agree”.
All the scales had acceptable internal consistency (ranging from .67 to .97 for both study samples). See Table 2 for the exact
reliability of the different scales for the two groups.2.3.1. National identity
This 9-item scale of which four items were negatively worded was  developed speciﬁcally for this study to measure partici-
pants’ national identiﬁcation. A sample item from the scale was  “Actually, it is unimportant for me  to be German/Norwegian”
(reversed). Across both samples, the exploratory maximum likelihood factor analyses supported a one-factor solution.
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Table 2
Psychometric properties of the major study variables.
Variable M SD  ˛ Skew t df est 2
National identity 9.07*** 424 .16
Norway 4.31 0.97 .84 −0.18
Germany 3.41 1.07 .89 0.25
National engagement, private −1.60 424 –
Norway 3.98 0.77 .67 −0.58
Germany 4.11 0.84 .78 −0.31
National engagement, public −4.20*** 424 .04
Norway 4.67 0.69 .68 −0.42
Germany 4.93 0.66 .78 −0.90
Religious identity 4.67*** 408.56 .05
Norway 4.85 1.00 .95 −1.68
Germany 4.34 1.26 .97 −0.81
Religious discrimination −4.44*** 416.70 .04
Norway 1.86 0.69 .92 1.23
Germany 2.19 0.81 .93 0.69
Negative representations media 2.20* 424 .01
Norway 4.06 0.81 .83 −0.92
Germany 3.88 0.91 .83 −0.79
Perceived Islamophobia −3.50** 424 .03
Norway 4.05 0.86 .90 0.01
Germany 4.34 0.84 .86 −0.43
Note. Norway: n = 210, Germany: n = 216.
* p < .05.
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*** p < .001.
.3.2. National engagement
Fifteen items based on Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver (2007) assessed acculturative attitudes (e.g., “I ﬁnd it unimportant
o follow Norwegian/German politics.”) and behavior (e.g., “How often do you inform yourself about Norwegian/German
olitics?”). These items evaluated the degree to which the participants valued the national majority culture and integrated
t into their daily lives. Half of the items were reversed. The scale distinguished between public and private life domains
Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2004). Private domains included communication in the majority language at home, social-
zation with friends belonging to the majority group and national cultural habits. Public domains included communication
n the majority language in public settings, socialization with, for instance, colleagues or fellow students belonging to the
ajority group, use of national media and interest in national politics.
The factor analyses of the items did not support the distinction between public and private domains proposed by Arends-
óth and van de Vijver (2004).  Because the factor structure did not provide grounds for alternative interpretations, two sum
cores representing national engagement in the private and public spheres were computed on theoretical grounds.
.3.3. Religious identity
The religious identity scale by Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) was used to assess participants’ religious identiﬁcation. Two  of
he three original subscales, namely “religious identity importance” and “religious behavioral involvement”, were included
n this study, whereas the third subscale “Muslim political organization” was  deemed irrelevant. In all, thirteen items (e.g.,
Being a Muslim is a very important part of how I see myself”) were used to measure participants’ religious identity. In
ontrast to the scale’s multidimensional structure observed by Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007),  factor analyses supported a
ne-factor solution in both the Norwegian and the German samples.
.3.4. Experienced religious discrimination
To identify the forms and settings in which the participants perceived both blatant and subtle forms of religious discrim-
nation, questions were asked based on the brief community version of the perceived ethnic discrimination questionnaire
Brondolo et al., 2005). A total of 17 items scored on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (never happened) to 5 (happened very often),
uch as “How often have you been treated unfairly by coworkers or classmates?”, measured the frequency of discrimination
xperienced across various settings. Two additional items assessing discrimination at airports and on the Internet were
dded. Unlike the original scale, each question assessed religious instead of ethnic discrimination.
.3.5. Experienced negative representations in the media
Four items assessed the respondents’ experiences of negative representations of Muslims in media. Similar to the instru-
ent above, a sample item was “How often have you seen newspapers or magazines that make Muslims look bad?” and
ere rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (never happened) to 5 (happened very often).
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2.3.6. Perceived Islamophobia
Twelve items, (e.g., “Many Norwegians consider Islam to be an evil ideology”), designed speciﬁcally for this study, were
used to measure the degree to which the respondents perceived the society and inhabitants of Norway or Germany as
islamophobic. Half of the items were reversed. Analyses of the scale’s factor structure supported a uni-dimensional scale.
To improve on the reliability, one item was deleted in both samples.
2.4. Analysis of data
To test the hypotheses, path analysis with a structural equation model using full information maximum likelihood
estimation was conducted with AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structures) version 18.
All hypotheses were tested through the model shown in Fig. 1. Due to the generally weak correlations between the main
and the demographic variables and to keep the model as parsimonious as possible, demographic variables were not included.
Diverse goodness-of-ﬁt estimates were used to evaluate the adequacy of the model. Furthermore, to check for differences
in the results between the two samples, differences in parameter values were tested by comparing the ﬁt of the unconstrained
path model with the ﬁt of a constrained path model.
3. Results
3.1. Differences between the samples on the different measures
Before testing our hypothetical model, we compared the German-Turks with their Norwegian counterparts (Norwegian-
Pakistanis) on the main instruments. With the exception of National engagement at the private level, the two groups differed
on all the scales. Sometimes the difference was in favor of the Norwegian sample, and sometimes in favor of the German
sample. The effect sizes also varied from small to large. A summary of these differences can be found in Table 2.
3.1.1. National identity
In the Norwegian sample, second-generation respondents reported signiﬁcantly higher national identiﬁcation (M = 4.43,
SD = 0.96), compared to ﬁrst-generation respondents (M = 3.99, SD = .92), t(208) = −3.05, p < .01; M = −.45, 95% CI [−.73,
−.16], est 2 = .04. In the German sample, naturalized participants reported higher national identiﬁcation (M = 3.59, SD = 1.14)
than those without the German nationality (M = 3.22, SD = .96), t(211.21) = −2.53, p < .01; M  = −.36, 95% CI [−.64, −.08]; est
2 = .03.
3.1.2. National engagement in the private and the public sphere.
In the German sample, non-German nationals signiﬁcantly displayed lower private national engagement compared to
the naturalized German-Turks (non-nationals: M = 3.98, SD = 0.84; naturalized: M = 4.22, SD = 0.84), t(214) = −2.16, p < .05;
M = −.25, 95% CI [−.47, −.02], est 2 = .02. Furthermore, religiously nonvisible German females reported higher private
national engagement than their religiously visible counterparts (nonvisible: M = 4.28, SD = 0.85; visible: M = 3.93, SD = 0.83),
t(121) = 1.99, p < .05; M = .35, 95% CI [.00, .70], est 2 = .03.
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Table 3
Correlations between major study variables for the Norwegian and German sample.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. National identity – .52 .37 −.36 −.24 −.16 −.10
2.  Private national engagement .51 – .70 −.39 −.13 −.12 −.07
3.  Public national engagement .43 .61 – −.25 −.00 −.04 .01
4.  Religious identity −.08 −.20 −.03 – .24 .26 −.01
5.  Experienced religious discrimination −.07 −.10 .02 −.03 – .50 .37
6.  Negative media representations .12 .10 .29 −.02 .37 – .43
7.  Perceived Islamophobia −.12 −.17 .01 −.02 .43 .43 –
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Note. Standardized coefﬁcients are presented. For the Norwegian sample (non-italic values), correlations of .17 or more are signiﬁcant at p < .05. Correlations
f  .29 or more are signiﬁcant at p < .01. Correlations of .37 or more are signiﬁcant at p < .001. For the German sample (italic values), Correlations of .16 or
ore  are signiﬁcant at p < .05. Correlations of .24 or more are signiﬁcant at p < .001.
.1.3. Religious identity
Contrary to Verkuyten and Yildiz’ (2007) ﬁnding where half of the Dutch-Turkish participants obtained the highest
ossible score on the instrument, none of the German-Turkish and only 1% of the Norwegian-Pakistani participants in this
tudy obtained the maximum score. The scale was  nevertheless moderately and negatively skewed in both samples.
.1.4. Experienced religious discrimination
All participants, with the exception of one person, had experienced some kind of religious discrimination. Still, the
ean value was below the midpoint of the scale in both samples. Across the samples, religiously visible females (Norway:
 = 1.94, SD = 0.67; Germany: M = 2.61, SD = 0.73) reported higher degrees of religious discrimination than their nonvisible
ounterparts did (Norway: M = 1.72, SD = 0.57; Germany: M = 1.91, SD = 0.68). Although the difference was  signiﬁcant in both
amples (Norway: t(137) = −2.07, p < .05; Germany: t(121) = −4.80, p < .001), the effect size was  large in the German sample
M = −.70, 95% CI [−.98, −.41]; est 2 = .16) but remained small in the Norwegian sample (M = −.22, 95% CI [−.43, −.01];
st 2 = .03).
.1.5. Experienced negative representations in the media
All participants except one in both samples had experienced negative portrayals of Muslims in the media. In both samples
he mean was above the midpoint of the scale. In the Norwegian sample, second-generation participants had experienced
ore negative representations of their religious group in media compared to ﬁrst-generation participants (ﬁrst generation:
 = 3.74, SD = .99; second generation: M = 4.19, SD = .69), t(81.34) = −3.18, p < .01, M = −.45, 95% CI [−.73, −.17]; est 2 = .05.
.1.6. Perceived Islamophobia
In both samples, the mean values were above the neutral midpoint of the scale and all participants perceived some degree
f Islamophobia. Second-generation Norwegian-Pakistani participants, on average, reported a higher degree of perceived
slamophobia than their ﬁrst-generation counterparts (second-generation: M = 4.14, SD = 0.82; ﬁrst-generation: M = 3.82,
D = 0.93), t(208) = −2.45, p < .05. However, the effect size of this difference was small, M  = −.32, 95% CI [−.58, −.06]; est
2 = .03.
.2. Structural equation model
Table 3 displays the correlations between the major variables for each sample. One model was estimated based upon both
amples. In the initial stage of constructing the model, all possible paths between the outcome, independent and mediating
ariables, as displayed in Fig. 1, were drawn. Several paths were deleted as they turned out to be insigniﬁcant in both samples.
The hypothetical model showed a good ﬁt across the ﬁt indices (see Table 4). The chi-square value indicated a well-ﬁtting
odel, 2 (8, N = 426) = 11.71, p = .165. Based on the RMSEA, the model demonstrated a close ﬁt, with the lower boundary ofhe conﬁdence interval even indicating an exact ﬁt, RMSEA = .033, 90% CI [.000, .071].
Testing for differences in results between the two  samples, a fully constrained version of the model was compared with
he corresponding unconstrained version. The unconstrained version performed better across all indices (see Table 4). Thus,
able 4
it indices for unconstrained and constrained structural equation models across groups (Norway and Germany).
Model 2 df CFI RMSEA AIC 2 df
Unconstrained 11.71 8 .995 .033 107.71
Constrained 57.46 25 .952 .055 119.46
Difference between models 45.75* 17
ote. CFI: Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA: Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; AIC: Akaike Information Criterion.
* p < .001.
J.R. Kunst et al. / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 36 (2012) 518– 532 525Fig. 2. Estimated model for Norwegian (non-italic values) and German sample (italic-values). Results from SEM analysis. Standardized coefﬁcients pre-
sented. Only paths signiﬁcant in at least one sample are displayed. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
the relationships between the variables in the model differed between the two  samples, suggesting that the model is not
generalizable across the samples. Consequently, the model was  separately estimated for the two samples (see Fig. 2).
3.2.1. Norwegian results
The estimated direct, indirect and total effects for the Norwegian sample can be found in Table 5.
3.2.1.1. Hypothesis 1. We  hypothesized participants’ religious identity to be negatively related to both national identiﬁcation
and national engagement. The correlation matrix partly supported the hypothesis. Although religious identity neither had
an effect on national identity nor on national engagement in the public sphere, the fact that it had a signiﬁcant negative
impact on private national engagement (  ˇ = −.20, p < .01) gave some support for the ﬁrst hypothesis.3.2.1.2. Hypothesis 2. The prediction here was that the religious stigma variables (i.e., perceived Islamophobia, negative
representations of Muslims in media and religious discrimination) would have a direct negative effect on the participants’
Table 5
Standardized direct, indirect and total effects of the predictor variables on the dependent variables in the structural equation model for the Norwegian
sample.
Predictor and outcome variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect
Perceived Islamophobia
National engagement, private −.15** – −.15
Negative representations in media
National identity .14* – .14
National engagement, private .17* – .17
National engagement, public .29*** – .29
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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Table 6
Standardized direct, indirect and total effects of the predictor variables on the dependent variables in the structural equation model for the German sample.
Predictor and outcome variable Direct effect Indirect effecta Total effect
Perceived Islamophobia
National identity – .08* .08
National engagement, private – .08* .08
National engagement, public – .04* .04
Perceived religious discrimination
National identity −.15* −.08** −.23
National engagement, private – −.08** −.08
National engagement, public – −.04** −.04
Negative representations in media
National identity – −.05** −.05
National engagement, private – −.09** −.09
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a Two sided bias-corrected conﬁdence intervals using bootstrap, *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
ational identity and national engagement. The coefﬁcients of the effects indicated only partial support to this hypothesis.
s hypothesized, perceived Islamophobia predicted a lower degree of private national engagement (  ˇ = −.15, p < .01).
However, contrary to the hypothesis, negative representations of Muslims in the media had a direct positive effect on all
f our outcome variables. To start with, negative media representations positively related to the participants’ public (  ˇ = .29,
 < .001) and private national engagement (  ˇ = .17, p < .01). In addition to affecting national engagement in both spheres,
egative representations in the media also positively predicted the national identity of the Norwegian-Pakistanis (  ˇ = .14,
 < .05).
.2.1.3. Hypothesis 3. With respect to this hypothesis, we expected different forms of religious stigma to have an indirect
egative effect on national identity and engagement mediated by religious identity. No evidence to support this hypothesis
as obtained. As the model did not reveal any indirect effects, we can conclude that religious identity did not mediate the
ffects of the independent variables on the outcome variables.
.2.2. German results
The estimated direct, indirect and total effects are displayed in Table 6.
.2.2.1. Hypothesis 1. Clear support was found for the ﬁrst hypothesis. Religious identity negatively affected national identity
 ˇ = −.32, p < .001) and private (  ˇ = −.39, p < .001) and public (  ˇ = −.26, p < .01) national engagement.
.2.2.2. Hypothesis 2. Regarding the second hypothesis, only one path (i.e., religious discrimination) supported the hypoth-
sized effect of religious stigma as a direct negative predictor of the outcome variables. Religious discrimination had a weak
irect negative impact on national identity (  ˇ = −.15, p < .05).
.2.2.3. Hypothesis 3. The results to the third hypothesis were more complex. In accordance with the hypothesis, religious
dentity mediated all indirect effects between the stigma constructs and the outcome variables (i.e., national identity, private
ational engagement and public national engagement). Furthermore, the coefﬁcients for two of the stigma constructs sup-
orted the hypothesis. Negative media representations had a negative indirect impact on the participants’ national identity
 ˇ = −.05, p < .01), private national engagement (  ˇ = −.09, p < .01) and public national engagement (  ˇ = −.10, p < .01), mediated
y religious identity. Similarly, religious discrimination was  a negative indirect predictor of the German-Turkish respon-
ents’ national identity (ˇ = −.08, p < .01), private national engagement (  ˇ = −.08, p < .01) and public national engagement
 ˇ = −.04, p < .01).
The effects of perceived Islamophobia on the outcome variables, however, were not as hypothesized. Perceived Islam-
phobia negatively predicted religious identity (  ˇ = −.19, p < .01), and had a positive indirect effect on national identity
ˇ = .08, p < .01), private national engagement (  ˇ = .08, p < .01) and public national engagement (  ˇ = .04, p < .01). In other
ords, although these ﬁndings supported the hypothesized role of religious identity acting as a mediator, they undermined
he hypothesized negative indirect effect of perceived Islamophobia on the outcome variables.
. Discussion
The goal of the present study was to investigate how Muslims, as a stigmatized minority group, negotiate their national
fﬁliation in contemporary Western European societies. Our results suggest that religious stigma indeed plays an important
ole. The results also suggest that religious identity does not only inﬂuence Muslim minorities’ national identiﬁcation and
ngagement, but also mediates the inﬂuence of religious stigma. While all our hypotheses were partially supported, a number
f the observed relations were contrary to our expectations.
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Considering a wide range of underlying cultural and contextual variables, while at the same time comparing results and
drawing more general conclusions as is common in cross-cultural research, is a major challenge (see Berry et al., 2011; Berry
& Sabatier, 2010). Due to the large divergence between the results for the two  samples, the ﬁndings for each hypothesis will
ﬁrst be discussed separately for each sample before taking a more comparative approach.
4.1. Discussion of the Norwegian results
4.1.1. Hypothesis 1
Results from the Norwegian portion of the study suggest that Norwegian-Pakistanis experience no conﬂict in identifying
both as a Muslim and as a Norwegian national. Earlier reports indicated that believing in a religion and belonging to the nation
are quite unrelated in Norway (European Commission, 2005; Gallup International, 2005). It appears that despite constitu-
tionally being a Christian country, Norway, at the grassroots level, is a highly secularized state. Accordingly, because most of
the Norwegian-Pakistani participants in our study were born and raised in Norway, they may  have internalized this secular
understanding and consequently consider their religious group afﬁliation as separate from their national identiﬁcation.
Nevertheless, the Norwegian results do not concur with the results of Sirin et al. (2008) in the US. However, the fact that
religious identity in the present study was negatively related to the degree to which the national culture was  integrated and
appreciated in the Norwegian-Pakistani participants’ private life sphere can be seen as supporting the ﬁndings of Verkuyten
and Yildiz (2007).  Research indicate that religious identity constitutes a central part of immigrants’ private cultural identity
and is supposed to be more resistant to change over time in the private than in the public sphere (see Navas et al., 2005).
Furthermore, although Norway may  be described as a secularized state, religion still seems to play a role in Norwegians’
private lives (see Zahl, Furman, Benson, & Canda, 2007). Hence, an alteration of the respondents’ religious identity seems to
solely affect the inclusion of the national majority culture in their private life sphere.
4.1.2. Hypotheses 2 and 3
4.1.2.1. Perceived Islamophobia. Perceived Islamophobia negatively predicted participants’ private national engagement.
We propose that for Norwegian-Pakistanis with a high religious identiﬁcation, an increased perception of a society where
Muslims and Islam are viewed as dangerous very likely triggers religious identity threats, reducing national engagement in
the private sphere.
This ﬁnding seems to be in line with a recent longitudinal study, which indicated that experiences of group rejection may
“discourage immigrants from identifying with the superordinate national in-group and result in a tendency to disengage
from it” (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009, p. 109). Furthermore, our ﬁndings seem to support the results of a study conducted
with Muslims in Spain (Chryssochoou & Lyons, 2011). Applied to the present study, the participants may  have reduced their
private national engagement because they belong to a group that they perceive as rejected by the broader society.
Still, contrary to what we expected, the Norwegian-Pakistani participants, probably facing a religious identity threat,
responded by neither increasing their religious identity nor decreasing their national identity or their national engagement
in the public sphere. As suggested by Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. (2009),  the participants’ religious identity may  have remained
unaffected because, given high religious identiﬁcation, “few beneﬁts may  result from the minor-increases in in-group identi-
ﬁcation that are possible in a group one already identiﬁes very strongly with” (p. 122). Moreover, it may be disadvantageous
to further increase one’s already high religious identity because it may  be perceived as a shift towards radicalism in light of
the ongoing public discourse.
Last but not least, the national identiﬁcation of the respondents was not inﬂuenced by perceived Islamophobia. Most of
the Norwegian-Pakistanis reported a high national identity, suggesting that they highly value belonging to the Norwegian
nation. Respondents may  therefore not have considered national disidentiﬁcation as an option.
4.1.2.2. Negative media representations. The variable assessing negative representations of Muslims in the media affected
all of the outcome variables and was the strongest predictor of the Norwegian-Pakistanis’ national afﬁliation. On the basis
of the suggested causal relations in the model and contrary to our expectations, the variable had a direct positive effect on
participants’ national identiﬁcation and their public and private national engagement. Stereotypically, Norwegian Muslims
have been portrayed as reluctant to integrate and to adopt Norwegian cultural values while simultaneously being accused
of creating and living in parallel societies. Frequent exposures to negative portrayals of Muslims in the media may  therefore
lead participants to question their sense of national belonging. When their national identity is threatened, they may pursue
counter-stereotypic behavior and attitudes to “contest and challenge (. . .)  labels and ascriptions” (Ehrkamp, 2006, p. 1676)
assigned to them in the media and public discourse.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that our suggested causal relations can be explained differently by reversing the direction
of the paths. Participants high on national identity and national engagement may  have simply informed themselves more
often through national media and are therefore exposed to more negative content about Muslims in the media.4.1.2.3. Religious discrimination. We  found no support for religious discrimination having either direct or indirect effects on
the mediating and outcome variables. Bearing in mind that the respondents’ average experienced religious discrimination
was low, these experiences may  not have been detrimental enough to cause either a religious or a national identity threat.
5t
p
t
s
4
4
t
s
t
t
t
a
f
t
C
p
2
(
v
M
m
r
p
C
4
4
e
i
o
r
b
4
i
t
c
i
4
c
p
e
b
e
i
t
p
4
d
a28 J.R. Kunst et al. / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 36 (2012) 518– 532
Furthermore, we assume that the participants attributed personal experiences of religious discrimination differently than
hey attributed experiences of stigma assessed by the other two  constructs. Although the participants may  have ascribed
erceived Islamophobia and negative media representations to sentiments prevalent in the society as a whole, we believe
hat they may  have imputed experiences of religious discrimination to attitudes of speciﬁc individuals, for instance, their
upervisor or colleague (see Branscombe et al., 1999).
.2. Discussion of the German results
.2.1. Hypothesis 1
The structural equation model gave support to a negative effect of religious identity on the participants’ national iden-
iﬁcation and their private and public national engagement. In a nutshell, for the German-Turks, identifying as a Muslim
eems to be quite incompatible with identifying with, and engaging in the German nation. These ﬁndings, while in line with
he results of Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007),  are inconsistent with that of Sirin et al. (2008).  Cultural characteristics related
o immigration to the respective continents may explain these differences in results. Sirin et al.’s study was conducted in a
raditional immigration country, or a ‘settler society’. However, the data of the present study were, like those of Verkuyten
nd Yildiz (2007),  gathered from a European nation state where immigration is a recent phenomenon, and stems largely
rom the middle of the last century. Although immigration to the U.S. has long been considered an essential building block of
he nation, the naturalization of immigrants has faced marked resistance in Western European countries (Brubaker, 1992).
onsistently, cultural pluralism has often been met  with skepticism and rejection, and integration has increasingly been
laced on equal terms with cultural assimilation (Brubaker, 1992; Bryant, 1997; Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2009; Fekete, 2004,
008).
Societies have often demanded that Muslims tone down their religious identity in order to facilitate their integration
Decker et al., 2010; Fekete, 2008). In this regard, Fekete (2008) emphasizes that, in Germany, “whenever there is a talk about
alues, the politicians and the churches stress the Christian aspect of German culture” (p. 15), which makes it difﬁcult for
uslims “to ﬁnd a place in society” (p. 15; also see Ehrkamp, 2006). As a consequence, the participants in the present study
ight have felt forced to choose between their identities and might have attenuated their national afﬁliation in favor of their
eligious identity. A previous study with Muslims in Germany support this assumption, as it shows that most participants
referred their Muslim identity when they had to choose between their religious and national identities (PEW Research
enter, 2006).
.2.2. Hypotheses 2 and 3
.2.2.1. Perceived Islamophobia. Contrary to the rationale of the second hypothesis, perceived Islamophobia had no direct
ffects on the outcome variables. Moreover, contrary to the third hypothesis, the indirect effects (mediated by religious
dentity) were positive.
Given the high pressure for cultural assimilation of immigrants in Germany and, in particular, the strong negative views
f Muslim minorities during the data collection, perceptions of Islamophobia may  have led the participants to decrease their
eligious identity in order to achieve national acceptance; they probably considered their religious identity as a barrier to
ecoming a member of the German nation.
.2.2.2. Negative media representations. The structural equation model revealed that negative representations of Muslims
n the media were negatively related to national identity and public as well as private national engagement. We  contend
hat experiences of negative depictions of Muslims in the media not only made the respondents particularly aware of their
ollective identity, but also triggered solidarity with Muslims in general. This in turn resulted in an increased religious
dentity, indirectly leading to lower degrees of national identiﬁcation and engagement.
.2.2.3. Religious discrimination. Experiences of religious discrimination across various settings constituted the only stigma
onstruct with a direct as well as several indirect negative effects on the outcome variables. We  argue that, due to the
ublic opinion climate in Germany, the German-Turks, in contrast to the Norwegian-Pakistanis, may  have interpreted their
xperiences of discrimination as a reﬂection of the entire German society instead of single individuals. Subsequently, we
elieve that the extent of discrimination may  have been sufﬁcient to cause national disidentiﬁcation (see Jasinskaja-Lahti
t al., 2009).
Furthermore, in accordance with Branscombe et al. (1999), the participants increased their religious identiﬁcation, which
ndirectly led to lower national identiﬁcation and national engagement. Repeated experiences of rejection are considered
o have detrimental effects on individuals’ well-being (Branscombe et al., 1999). To maintain a positive self-concept and to
rotect their well-being, German-Turks probably enhance their religious group membership.
.3. General discussionThe present study suggests that stigma affects Muslims’ identity formation, but its effects may  not be consistent across
ifferent cultural groups and nations. When considering the results of the samples separately, the ﬁndings were multifaceted
nd did not point in the same directions. A number of inferences can, however, be drawn.
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First, identifying oneself as a Muslim seems to be more of an obstacle to identifying with Germany than with Norway
as a nation. As Ethier and Deaux (1994) note, “new environments may challenge the meaning or value of an iden-
tity” (p. 244). Additionally, “crisis events”, such as the particularly tense and almost inﬂammatory public discourse in
Germany at the time of the data collection,2 could have brought the respondents’ religious identity to the fore in a dra-
matic fashion (see Peek, 2005). Accordingly, because their religious identity was extensively targeted in public discourse,
the German-Turks might have counteracted the stigma directed towards their religious group by altering their national
afﬁliation.
However, the results in the German sample do not imply that for Muslims in general, a low religious identity is a
prerequisite for a pronounced national afﬁliation and vice versa. These ﬁndings underscore the importance of contextual
variables in promoting the coexistence of religious and national identities. We  consider these variables, which may  con-
tribute to an enhanced national commitment and sense of belongingness among Western European Muslims, to be less
prevalent in Germany than in Norway. Clinging to the notion that German nationality, in essence, is determined by eth-
nicity (see Bryant, 1997), German politicians have been unwilling to support the naturalization of immigrants (Brubaker,
1992; Ehrkamp, 2006). Likewise, immigrants in Germany seem to view the process of naturalization as not only a “change
in legal status, but change in nature, (. . .)  a social transubstantiation that immigrants have difﬁculty imagining, let alone
desiring” (Brubaker, 1992, p. 78). Thus, the German-Turkish participants in our study may  have perceived that by afﬁli-
ating with Germany they diminish or even eliminate the possibility to identify with their Turkish culture, including their
religion.
Furthermore, the results in both samples indicate that belonging to a stigmatized group may  not only be a deﬁning part of
Muslims’ lives, but may  also have crucial consequences for their orientation towards their society of settlement. The fact that
the stigma constructs had positive as well as negative effects in both samples points to Muslim minorities’ difﬁcult position
in society. As experiences of religious stigmatization reinforce their perceived discrepancy between being a Muslim and
being a member of the nation, they seem to be torn between their willingness to become integrated members of the nation
and their wish to maintain their religious afﬁliation. Keeping in mind the profound negative effects of stigma on well-being,
we suggest that encouraging, rather than discouraging religious diversity may  be the primary foundation for strengthening
Muslims’ bonds with the nation.
Strikingly, religious identity only mediated the effects of religious stigma on the participants’ national afﬁliation in the
German sample. A possible explanation for the mediating effects of religious identity in the German sample may  be that
in Germany the islamophobic environment was severe enough to make the participants question their religious identity
when facing religious stigmatization (see Ethier & Deaux, 1994). Furthermore, the German-Turks may  have adapted to
and internalized the notion that identifying as a Muslim composes the main barrier to successful integration into German
society.
4.4. Strengths and limitations
Our study has both strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, our model showed good ﬁtness to the data across
both study samples. Several paths in our model were signiﬁcant, and portions of the variances of all outcome variables could
be accounted for in both samples. The explained variance, however, remained small. While several tendencies could be
observed, other unobserved variables, such as ethnic identity, probably had an important role in the participants’ identity
formation.
Most instruments in the present study seemed to be equally reliable in both samples. However, because our study
investigated two groups only, we did not extensively investigate the structural and measurement equivalence across the
samples (see Byrne & van de Vijver, 2010, for a discussion).
Notably, the instruments measuring national engagement achieved only acceptable Cronbach’s alpha values in the Nor-
wegian sample. Because the scales were adapted from acculturation instruments, low alpha values are common and could be
expected (see Matsudaira, 2006). Nevertheless, one major critique is that acculturation scales do not assess phenomena that
are uniform across cultures and maybe highly dependent on distinct cultural characteristics of the investigated population
(Matsudaira, 2006). In addition, our scales only assessed national engagement in a limited number of domains, which may
not be equally important for the two populations (see Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001 for a discussion). Finally, we  found no
support for a distinction between the private and public life domains in either of the sample, as proposed by Arends-Tóth
and van de Vijver (2004).  Thus, whether it makes sense to statistically distinguish between these two  domains remains a
topic for future research.
Although the two ethnic groups for this study were comparable along several dimensions, we  should have ideally used
samples of the same ethnic background in both countries to increase the comparability of the results and to control for
cultural variables. However, considering the intrasample homogeneity of each sample, the fact that the vast majority of each
sample shared the same heritage, religious and ethnic backgrounds and place of residence might increase the generalizability
of the results to the broader respective populations. Still, it is questionable to which extent the ﬁndings in this study can be
generalized to Muslims in general or to Muslim minorities with a different ethnic background or immigration history. As
2 In particular, we  are referring to the public discourse caused by the politician Thilo Sarrazin.
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n example, one could expect that for Muslims, who  left their heritage country for reasons other than work (e.g., refugees),
he development of a national afﬁliation may  be quite different from Muslim minorities who  are descendants of labor
mmigrants. Furthermore, as most of the participants were female, the ﬁndings may  be more representative of them than
f male Muslims.
The data collection process is another possible limitation of the study. The fact that the study involved ﬁlling out an
nline questionnaire most likely resulted in recruiting individuals with easy access to the Internet, who  may  be better off
conomically, and at a different stage of structural integration than those who  had no such easy access. In essence, the study
ossibly excluded individuals who did not have such easy Internet access.
It is important to add that societies are constantly changing and the collection of data and how participants respond to
uestions will be inﬂuenced by prevailing societal events. As such, the need for longitudinal designs to help capturing the
mpacts of such events in future research on the topic cannot be overemphasized.
. Conclusion
To recap, politicians and nationals of many Western societies have frequently expressed concerns about an apparent lack
f integration of Muslim minorities. In public discourse, the main responsibility for this situation has been given to Muslims
hemselves, whereas little attention has been paid to societal circumstances. However, our study suggests that religious
tigma constitutes a major obstacle to Muslims’ national afﬁliation. In order to achieve a common national cohesiveness and
ommitment among all cultural groups in multicultural and multireligious societies, primary attention should therefore be
aid to nurturing intercultural relations, rather than reinforcing religious prejudice. As fear causes avoidance, and avoidance
revents people from challenging their prejudgments and stereotypes, we consider political campaigns promoting contact
etween religious groups as a suitable and powerful tool to decrease religious intolerance. Despite the fact that many Western
uropean countries are becoming increasingly multireligious, substantial parts of their populations still seem to be wary
nd suspicious of this development and tend to reject cultural diversity. Developing programs on the basis of the present
tudy may  be a useful approach to change the latter attitudes.
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